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Abstract
This paper examines the effects of changes in amenity levels on
the bid prices for land and on the marginal worth of an amenity. The
vehicle for analysis is a closed-city urban spatial model containing
an explicit utility function and explicitly specified, spatial distri-
butions of amenities. Issues addressed include the behavior of bid
price (and property value) schedules in response to amenity changes;
the impact of such changes on the utility of renters, under conditions
of both identical and disparate tastes; the effect of amenity changes
on the amenity's schedule of marginal worth; and the relation of such
a schedule in a closed city to that in an open city.

Amenity Changes, Property Values and
Hedonic Prices in a Closed City
by Marvin Frankel*
I, Introduction
It is generally recognized that differences in amenity levels across
space give rise to differences in property values, and that the latter
differences provide a basis for estimating the implicit worth of the
amenity. This paper addresses selected issues within the amenity-
property value domain. Some of these issues have been treated elsewhere
from somewhat different vantage points or with different emphases,
while others have received little attention. The vehicle for analysis
is a closed city urban spatial model of the familiar kind (see for
example, Polinsky and Shavell, 1976, Section 4), containing an explicit
consumer utility function and alternative, explicitly defined, spatial
distributions of amenity levels.
Questions addressed in the paper include the following:
How does the equilibrium bid price or rent contour shift in response
to shifts in the pattern of amenity levels, and how are the burdens or
benefits of changes in those levels shared between renters and property
owners?
What do shifts in the rent contour imply with regard to the mar-
ginal willingness-to-pay for a given amenity level? Does marginal
willingness-to-pay behave in a predictable way?
How are hedonic estimates of amenity worth affected by the closed
city assumption?
What are the implications for rents and amenity prices if subgroups
of the resident population are differentially sensitive to the amenity?
-2-
In the multiple group situation, is it possible that an environ-
mental change that benefits one subgroup will be deterimental to another?
A few words may be in order regarding the operational usefulness
2
or policy relevance of a closed city model. First, in the short run
all "cities" or residential areas are, as a practical matter, closed.
Decisions to change residence or neighborhood take time, and the period
may be extended if there is uncertainty as to the permanence of an amenity
change. Second, movement into or out of an area may be inhibited by the.
special attachments that households often develop for place of residence
and neighborhood. Given such attachments, small or modest amenitv changes
may not prompt commensurate residential adjustments. Third, occupational
need may place a premium on a given residential location, particularly
if housing and transportation configurations make between-city moves
costly. For all of these reasons, the closed city setting as compared
with the open one, may be as relevant or more relevant for analysis.
Finally, it should be noted that the implications of the open city model
are rather straightforward, whereas those of the closed city model are
less well understood.
II. The Basic Model with Linear Decay
Let there be a disamenity source, such as waste disposal site or
an airport emanating noise, located at one end of an island-like, elon-
gated land mass devoted to residential dwellings. The area is essen-
tially self-contained, being separated from other communities by sub-
3
stantial transportation costs. A given number of persons, or
households reside in this area. The disaraenitv is most intense at its
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source, with the intensity diminishing steadily with distance from the
source.
As an initial case, for reference purposes, we assume our population
to be homogeneous in its tastes and preferences, including sensitivity
to the disamenity. We assume also that its members have identical in-
comes. Let each consumer have a utility function of the Cobb-Douglas
form,
(1) U = M
a
L
8
Z
Y
and a budget constraint,
(2) M + PL = y
where M = quantity consumed (per capita) of
(
a numeraire good with unit price
L = quantity consumed (per capita) of residential land
Z = quantity of the environmental disamenity present at any location
(and consumed by the consumers at that location) , in turn a
function of distance from the disamenity source
P = price per unit of land
y = income of the consumer
2, 3, Y = parameters, with a > 0, 3 > 0, y < 0-
Substituting (2) into (1) and maximizing utility gives demand functions
for each of the two goods,
(4) L
-TTT?
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Substituting (3) and (4) back into the utility function, treating util-
ity as a constant, and solving for P gives:
(5) P - jy 6 U" 1/6 Zy/0
a -
a/8
where j = (—p^) (__.)
The quantity of the disamenity, Z, or its intensity, varies inversely with
the consumer's (or renter's) distance, X, from the source. Hence (5) may
be written
a+S
(5a) P - jy B u- 1/6Z(X)^
The last equation describes a family of bid price contours over the
limited residential land space (Rosen, 1974, p. 38; Polinsky and Shave 11,
1976, p. 122). Each contour describes a set of utility-equalizing prices
for varying distances from the disamenity source. The position and shape
of these contours depends, among other things, on the intensity of the
disamenity as it emanates from the source, on its propagation pattern
over the land-space, and on the consumer's aversion to it (as expressed
in y) . The contour that comes actually to prevail depends on the con-
sumer's demand for land, as indicated by (4), and on the aggregate number
of such consumers competing for the available supply of land.
Let there be N consumers, or renters, seeking shelter in the limited
land space. Then we may write
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(6) D(X)wdX = N
J
where X = a parameter denoting distance from the disamenity source to
the terminal point of the land space or island
D = population density, or persons per acre (which varies with the
price of land and, in turn, with distance from the source)
w = width of the land space or island, taken equal to unit dis-
tance, e.g., one mile
The left side of (6) sums the residents over the available land space.
This number must equal the total who bid for that space, or the popula-
tion of the area. Population density may be expressed as
(6a) D(X)
L(X)
That is, density equals the reciprocal of land consumed per capita, with
both in turn dependent on distance from the disamenity source. Substi-
tuting for L(X) from (4) and, in (4), for P from (5a) gives in place
of (6a),
(6b) D(X) = —-— jy U Z.(X)
Now let the intensity of the disamenity Z, be described by the decay
function,
(6c) Z = c - gX
where c = disamenity intensity, or level, at the source, i.e., X =
% = a decay coefficient
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The left panel of Figure 1 shows three such decay functions, labeled m
,
m_ and m_. Substituting (6c) into (6b) and the result, in turn, into
(6) gives
fX
(a + S) . a/S TT- 1/8, v.y/B , v m= jy U (c - gX) wdX = N
6
(6d)
and performing the integration results in
*+ 1 X + 1
(6e) (a + 8)jya/BU- 1/S
(y \ g) [c
6
- (c - gX) B ] = N
or
(6f) u" 1/B = Mx-±JL
(a + 8)jya/B [c 8 - (c - gX) 6 ]
Equation (6f) expresses the equilibrium utility level (to the indicated
power) and substituting it into (5a) gives the equilibrium bid-price or
rent contour:
(7) P =
Nyg(y + g)(c - gX) Y/B
(a + B)[c B - (c - gX) B ]
As indicated by the derivative 3P/3X, this contour slopes positively
over the land space as distance, X, from the disamenity source increases.
Such a contour is illustrated in the right panel of Figure 1 by the curves
designated n. and n„. It can be shown to rise more steeply for higher
values of jv| and g, and less steeply for higher values of a. The ef-
fect of a change in 8 is not conclusive and depends on the values of
other parameters.
Consider in this closed city a given initial situation, including
a given disamenity intensity, as described by the m. curve in the left
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panel of Figure 1, and an associated equilibrium rent contour, represented
by the n. curve in the right panel of the same figure. The differential
prices displayed along the contour reflect differential land quality in
terms of the disamenity. Better land draws higher rents, and one might
expect that an improvement in land quality through a reduction in the
disamenity would be reflected in higher rents.
Suppose now the intensity of the disamenity decreases at the source
—
i.e., a decline in c—and hence across the neighboring land space. With
linear decay, this means that all properties experience the same absolute
reduction in the disamenity. The effect will be a shift in the slope and
position of the equilibrium rent contour. The case is illustrated in
the left and right panels of Figure 1 by the decay function m and the
associated contour n . The pre- and post-abatement contours are seen
to intersect, with rents (and implicitly, property values) for properties
to the left of the intersection showing a decline, and rents for properties
to the right of the intersection showing a rise. (The contours must
intersect if the equality between the demand and supply of land is to be
sustained. For if prices everywhere fell, there would be excess demand,
and if prices everywhere rose, there would be excess supply.)
Proof that abatement in the manner described causes the countour
to rotate counterclockwise, so that the new contour intersects the
original one from below rather than above, can be had in the following
manner. First, note that at the intersection X = X the pre-abateraent
price, P., equals the post-abatement price, P_. Second, examine the
derivative 3P/3X in the neighborhood of the intersection, X = X_. It
turns out that 5P./3X * 3P„/9X as (c
2
"gX
Q ) <
(c^gXg) and hence as
-8-
>
c
^ c.. Thus, if c_ < c.., as it is with abatement, then the post-
abatenent curve n in the right panel of Figure 1 will have a steeper
slope than the pre-abatement curve, n.. .
This outcome may strike the reader as counter-intuitive. It is
associated with the fact that under linear decay, with a decrease in
source intensity, properties more remote from the source, while enjoying
the same absolute decrease in the disamenity level as other properties,
experience also a greater proportional decline than the latter. The
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remote properties thus become relatively more attractive. The result,
given the type of preference function assumed, is an increase in bid-
prices for the remote properties and a fall in the bid-prices of closer-
in properties. Were abatement to entail a decrease in the slope of the
decay function, coincident with a decrease in source intensity, so as
to cause the close in properties to become relatively more attractive,
or less unattractive, than previously, the outcome would be reversed,
and the equilibrium rent contour would rotate in a clockwise direction.
This result would be produced if, for example, in the left panel of
Figure 1, abatement involved a shift from the decay function m to the
decay function m
This characteristic of a linear decay function should be borne in
mind in subsequent discussion. In the policy realm, it is usually thought
more important to provide abatement where the pollution level is high
rather than where is is low. In the realm of airport noise abatement,
this outcome may result from selected changes in aircraft flight profiles
and operating procedures. Such changes, while reducing noise for prop-
erties close in, may sometimes even increase it for those further out.
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Her.ce, as a practical matter abatement in the manner first described in
the left panel of Figure 1, through a shift from m to m,, , may not
often be observed. It suffices nonetheless as an initial reference case.
To understand the implications of this case for both renters and
property owners, consider a household at location X
, the intersection
of the two rent contours. The rent for this household does not change
with abatement, and the household enjoys a simple utility increase.
Since price differences are utility-equalizing, all other households on
contour n„ enjoy the same level of utility as the household at X
n
and
with abatement experience the same net increase in utility as its does.
For these other households, the net utility gain is an amalgam of abate-
ment benefits and price changes. Households to the right of the inter-
section enjoy relatively large (subjective) abatement benefits that are
partially offset by price increases, while households to the left of the
intersection enjoy smaller (subjective) abatement benefits which are
augmented by price reductions. For the property owner, as distinct from
the renter, the effects of abatement are mixed. Properties to the right
of X
,
whose rents rise, rise in value, while those to the left of X
n
fall in value. For the owner-occupant, the utility gain of the renter
must be added to the property value change to determine the net result.
For properties sufficiently to the left of X_, one might expect that the
negative (capitalized) owner effect would outweigh the positive renter
effect, resulting in a net loss.
III. Amenity Price Under Linear Decay
A price or marginal worth for the disamenity, or for abatement, is
implied by the equilibrium rent contour, and one might suppose that this
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worth could be elicited through the methods of hedonic price measurement.
A common procedure is to regress property value on a set of explanatory
variables, including the disamenity variable Z. Define gross rent, R
(whose capitalized value is property value), as the product of unit land
rental, P, and the quantity of land consumed per capita, L, so that
(7a) R = PL
In our simplified urban setting, R is implicitly affected by Z, changes
in which influence P. The marginal willingness to pay for the dis-
amenity, or for abatement, is then
This expression is, with utility maximization, equivalent, as it should
be, to the marginal rate of substitution of the disamenity for the
numeraire good, M. (See, e.g., Diamond and Tolley, 1982, pp. 12-13.)
The equilibrium bid price contour, as shown in (7), can be transformed
to the equivalent of (7b) by taking its derivative with respect to Z,
multiplying by L, substituting for L from the demand expression given
in (4), and finally substituting for P from (7) itself. The result is
(7c) 11 = _JUL_K J 3Z (a+8)Z
This equation shows that marginal willingness to pay for the disamenity
(MWTPZ)—in this case marginal compensation for it, since y < —declines
as the disamenity level rises. A simple linear regression of R on L
and Z would yield a regression coefficient for Z that approximated the
average of the MWTPZ values. It would thus overstate the MWTPZ for
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consuners subjected to high disamenity levels and understate it for
those located at low disamenity levels.
Three points may be noted about expression (7c). First, contrary
to what one ordinarily might expect, MWTPZ depends only on the quantity
consumed of good Z and is independent of L or its price, P. This out-
come simply reflects one of the restrictive properties of the Cobb-
o
Douglas utility function. Second, while unit land rent, P— the mar-
ginal willingness to pay for land—behaves in an aberrant way in response
to changes in source intensity, c, so that changes in observed bid-
price or rent levels offer no guidance as to the worth of disamenity
changes, the MWTPZ is independent of c and stable in the face of shift-
ing absolute and relative rent levels. It thus serves as an unequivo-
cal indicator of that which it purports to measure. Third, MWTPZ as
expressed in (7c) is identical to the result that obtains when an open
city, rather than a closed city, is assumed. The distinguishing fea-
ture of an open city is an exogenously given utility level (Polinsky
and Shavell, 1976, p. 123), and the result shown in (7c) can be derived
from equations (5) and (4), which do not rest on the closed city as-
sumption, when the utility level is treated as exogenous. Thus, the
closed city assumption has no restrictive significance for hedonic
estimates of MWTPZ. Perhaps it should be noted that a difference be-
tween open- and closed-city results, where present, would not in itself
compromise the closed-city outcomes. There is nothing inherently
superior about an MWTPZ or an equilibrium rent contour from an open
city as compared to a city that is closed. Both represent valid valua-
tions, within their respective contexts, by participating consumers.
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IV. The Case of Exponential Decay
In place of a linear decay function for the disamenity, consider
an alternate case of an exponential decay function. Explicitly, suppose
in place of (6c) above we have
(8) Z = ce"
gX
where e is the natural log base and the other symbols have the same
meanings as before. Substituting this expression into (6b) and then
repeating, with necessary adjustments, the steps described in (6c)
through (6e) yields the equilibrium utility level,
(9) U"
1
T
- B NgY
2LX _ SlL
(a + B)jy 6 c B (l - e 6 )
Substituting (9) into (5a) gives the equilibrium rent contour,
_ SZ£
( 9a) p =
Nv^
1
.six
(a + 6)(1 - e 6 )
This contour would rise across the landspace, moving outward from the
source, at an increasing rate. Its general shape would thus resemble that
of, say, contour n. in the right panel of Figure 1. Its other properties
are similar to the case of linear decay. The contour rises more steeply
with (y), with S and with g and less steeply with a.
In contrast to the earlier case, the bid-price contour is independent
of c, the intensity of the disamenity at the source. It is, that is to
9
say, a stationary contour. Changes in c and, in consequence, in the
intensity of the disamenity at every location leave rents everywhere
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unchanged. In this situation, renters bear the full impact of the dis-
amenity change. If there is abatement, its benefits, unmodified by any
rent changes, flow directly to them. If instead, pollution increases,
its impact, again unmodified by any rent changes, is borne by them.
Property owners, as distinct from renters, are shielded from disamenity
change. With rents constant, they gain nothing from environmental im-
provement and lose nothing from environmental deterioration. Obviously
in this situation the observed change (of zero) in rents or property
values with a change in the disamenity cannot serve as a helpful guide
to the worth of the disamenity change to the renters who bear its impact.
An intuitive explanation of the stationary characteristic of the
contour described by (9a) is that, with exponential decay, the disamenity
intensity at any location relative to other locations remains invariant
to changes in the source level. This circumstance, jointly with the
properties of the Cobb-Douglas form of utility function, generate an
equilibrium contour independent of c.
With regard to hedonic estimates of implicit amenity worth or
price, the conclusions to be drawn are the same as those presented for
the earlier case of linear decay. The MWTPZ, as expressed in (7c),
does not in any way depend on the form taken by the decay function,
Z(X).
V. Differential Tastes with Linear Decay
The foregoing analysis treats the population of renters as homo-
geneous in tastes. Typically, however, this is not the case. Commonly
there is a differential sensitivity among individuals to a disamenity,
with scne more bothered than others by air pollutants, noise or aesthetic
-14-
impairments. This circumstance has relevance for the interpretation
of damage or benefit estimates based on hedonic price functions. This
relevance is not entirely unique to the closed city model, but such a
model provides a useful basis for analysis and illustration.
Extending our earlier framework, let there now be two groups of
consumers, with one (the S group) more sensitive to the disamenity than
the other (the I group). Otherwise, the utility functions of the mem-
bers of the two groups are assumed to be identical. For a member of
the S group, the utility function is
(10) U
x
= M
a
L
B
Z
X
and for a member of the I group this function is
(10a) U
2
= M
a
L
S
Z
2
where Y-, and y 2 are the respective disamenity coefficients, with
Y- < Y2 < 0, and the other symbols have the same meanings as before.
Individuals in both groups have the same incomes and budget constraints,
as described in (2) above. Following the earlier procedure, we may then
derive for each group an expression equivalent to (5a) that describes
the family of bid-price contours:
ct+B
_
1 2i
(ID p
x
= jy S u
x
8
z(x) s
a+6
_
1 ^2
(11a) P
2
= jy
3
U
2
8
Z(X) 6
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The I group will outbid the S group for land with relatively high
disamenity levels—that is, land nearer to the source, while the S group
will come to occupy the land more distant from the source. There will
be a border, designated X, at which the two groups meet, and at the bor-
der P = P . The equating of (11) and (11a) expresses this border con-
dition:
ct+g
_
1 ][l a+6_
_
1 2l
(12) jy 6 U~ 3 Z(X) 8 = jy 3 U~ SZ(X) S
Let there be N
1
members in the S group and N„ members in the I group.
Both groups must fit into their respective segments of land space. Then
for the S group, analogous to (6),
(13)
fX
„ D (X)wdX = N
X
and for the I group,
•X
(13a) D (X)wdX = N
Z Z
The left sides of (13) and (13a) serve to sum the residents over the re-
spective segments of land space. Following the procedures earlier des-
cribed (for the one-group case) in equations (6a) through (6e) , first
for the S group and then for the I group, yields the following pair of
equations, analogous to (6e)
:
(14) (a + 6)jySU
1
6
q(v I g)
[(c - gX) g - (c- gX) B J = \
(14a) (a + 3)jy6U 8 .
1
;
J c : - (c - gX) 3 ] = N,
:(v_ + 3)
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Rewriting (12) to incorporate linear decay gives
q+B
_
1 ^jL o+6_ 1 ^2
(14b) jy e ff
1
£ (c - gX) B = jy B U
2
6 (c - gX) S
The last three equations, containing the three unknowns U.. , U_ and X
jointly express the conditions for a price-location equilibrium for the
two groups of households.
Unfortunately, these equations cannot be solved for the equilibrium
values of the variables and, in turn, the equilibrium rent contours.
However, it is possible to make some headway with the problem by consid-
ering a limiting case. Let the I group be completely insensitive to
the disamenity, so that y = 0. Equation (14a) may then be written
(15) U6, = %*
where A = (—
-)
Substituting this expression into (14b) and simplifying gives
i a li
(15a) u^ . AVX(c - gX)
2
Substituting (15) into (11a) and simplifying gives a quasi-equilibrium
rent contour for the I group:
ByN„
(16) P 9 =
*-_
(a + B)X
Substituting (15a) into (11) gives the corresponding contour for the S
group
:
-17-
L
Y l
(16a) P. =
6yN
2
(c - gX)
1
] 7^-
(a + 3)X(c - gX) 6
Equation (16) indicates that the rent contour for the I group is, as
expected, invariant with X, or horizontal. Other things given, the level
of the equilibrium price varies inversely with the location of the border.
The more distant the border, the greater the amount of land available
to the insensitive group and the lower its price. Equation (16a) indi-
cates a rent contour for the S group that rises with X, becoming steeper
as X increases. It thus has the same general shape as the contour for
the one-group case. The situation is shown in Figure 2 by the segmented
contour labeled n .
The analytics of the two-group case are helpful in understanding
the impact of a disamenity on a population of divergent tastes. Although
it is often assumed that those subjected to high levels of a disamenity
bear a larger burden than those exposed to lower levels, there is no
basis for this belief in the case just presented. Indeed, the opposite
view may be taken. Consider one household from each group located at
the border on n in Figure 2. They pay the same price for property and
they have the same incomes. They also have identical utility functions,
except that Y-, < Y ? = 0. Putting aside the usual strictures against
cardinal utility and interpersonal utility comparisons, we may conclude
that U„ > U, . This also is evident from a comparison of equations (15)
and (15a) . Vhat is true at the border must also be true for the respective
groups of which the two households are members. This is simply to say
that those net sensitive £o a disamenity need not share the burden it
imposes
.
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Consider now contour n in Figure 2 to reflect some initial level
of the source intensity. Suppose now c decreases, lowering the disamenity
level across all properties. Since P
?
is independent of c or Z, the
family of contours for the I group remains inert or unresponsive. However,
the family of contours for the S group will, as in the one group case,
shift and rotate in a counterclockwise direction. The border will shift
and price at the border will adjust, but in which direction?
If the border moves to the left, equation (16) indicates that the
(horizontal) equilibrium contour for the I group, including price at the
border, will rise. If the border moves to the right, the opposite will
occur. Only the latter of these possibilities is consistent with the
outcome we observed earlier, in Section II, for the one-group case. By
analogy with that case, we may infer that the equilibrium contour of
the S group rotates in a counterclockwise direction and intersects the
original contour from below. We conclude therefore that with abatement
through a decrease in c, X will move right, price at X will decline, U_
will rise (from (15)) and U. also will rise (from (15a)). The new
equilibrium contour for both groups will appear as in Figure 2, desig-
nated n 7 .
We thus find that a reduction in the intensity of the disamenity
benefits the I group (as well as the S group), its insensitivity not-
withstanding. This result occurs through movement of the border and
adjustment of price, with the group now occupying more land than pre-
viously. At the same time, the owners of this set of properties, in
contrast to their insensitive renters, are affected adversely by the
change, since their rents fall and their property values decline, "ere
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the abatement to be financed by a special levy on property owners, this
group would be doubly injured. So also would those owning properties
lying between the new border and the intersection of n with n_,
since their rents and property values also decline.
These observations apply to our standard situation in which, with
the reduction in source intensity, the decay gradient remains constant.
In the left panel of Figure 1, the shift is from m.. to m_. However,
recalling our earlier discussion (in Section II) , a change in the slope
of the decay function coincident with a change in source intensity—one
like the shift from m_ to m_ in the left panel of Figure 1—could
reverse the outcome. That is, with abatement, the border would shift
to the left and price would rise. Under these conditions, the group of
insensitive renters would be adversely affected by abatement. By the
same token, they would benefit from an increase in pollution, as through
a shift from m to m_, since more land would become available to them
at a lower price. This latter case illustrates nicely how a reduced-
quality or "spoiled" public good may be advantageous to some households,
just as used cars and blemished merchandise may bring benefits to cer-
tain buyers. As before, the interests of renters and property owners
are antithetical, since the owners bear the burden of the pollution-
induced declines in rents and property values.
Our assessment of the two-group case takes advantage of the assump-
tion that v = 0. We may infer that the conclusions remain essentially
the same for situations in which the I group is averse to the disamenity
in slight or moderate degree. With decreases in c (and the decay gradient
constant), the contours of both groups will shift and rotate counterclockwise,
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and the border will shift right and price will fall. With higher levels
of aversion, the border will still shift right, but at some point price
at the border will begin to rise rather than fall.
With regard to the MWTPZ and hedonic price estimation, the outcomes
for the two-group case are a straightforward extension of those for the
one-group case. For an I group that is wholly insensitive to the dis-
amenity, the MWTPZ is zero. For the S group, the MWTPZ is the same as
previously given in expression (7c). As before, it is independent of
c and stable in the face of shifting rent levels. For both groups con-
sidered jointly, the implied net relationship between property value
and the disamenity level, Z, has the general form indicated in Figure 3.
With simple linear regression, the regression coefficient associated
with Z will now reflect an overall average for the S and the I groups,
rather than an average for the S group alone. Hence it will tend to
understate MWTPZ for the S group and overstate it for the I group.
VT. Differential Tastes with Exponential Decay
When the exponential decay function is substituted for the linear
decay function, the results change. But they are largely inferable from
the earlier discussion in Sections V and IV. The three equations whose
solution for U..
,
U 9 and X would yield the respective equilibrium rent
contours for the I and S groups are straightforward variants of expres-
sions (14), (14a) and (14b). The equations corresponding to (14) and
(14a) are derived by integrating with respect to X, as described in
-eX(13) and (13a) , when Z = ce a rather than Z = c-gX. The equation
corresponding to (14b) involves the simple substitution of the former
decay function for the latter. The resulting three equations, like the
-21-
earlier triad, cannot be solved, so resort is again had to the limiting
case where y = 0. This permits the derivation, as before, of expres-
sions for the quasi-equilibrium rent contours of the two groups. The
source intensity parameter c is now absent not only from the expression
for the I group but also from that for the S group.
The contour segment for the I group is horizontal, as it was in
the case of linear decay, while that for the S group rises over the
land space at an increasing rate. Thus, the general shape of the joint
contour is like, say, the n contour in Figure 2. Since both segments
of the contour are independent of the source intensity parameter, both
are stationary in face of changes in c, and the overall contour is
stationary. Equilibrium rents are thus unresponsive to source abate-
ment, just as they were in the one-group case.
The implications for hedonic price estimation of the two-group
case with exponential decay are identical to those indicated for the
corresponding case of linear decay. As previously noted, the MWTPZ
is independent of the form taken by the decay function.
The foregoing results can, with modest adjustments, be adapted to
the case where y < y < 0. The close-in segment of the rent contour that
previously was horizontal now becomes upward sloping, rising at an in-
creasing rate, and the overall contour continues to be stationary. The
MWTPZ, rather than being zero for the I group, will now be positive for
both groups, and regression estimates will yield an average value over
both groups.
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VII. Concluding Remarks
In concluding, it may be helpful to contrast certain of the results
of this closed city analysis with those that would obtain in an open
city setting. In an open city, the rent paid for any level of amenity
within a given area or locale will be determined by external or economy-
wide forces. The result is a reference schedule of rents that governs
everywhere. For convenience, suppose in Figure 4 that the original
rent contour labeled n conforms to the reference level, and that it
governs in a particular locale like the ones earlier discussed but which
for the present is open. If now abatement through a decline in source
intensity occurs in this locale the contour will be displaced to the
left—that is, every point on the original contour will shift to the
left—and rent at every location will rise to the reference level appro-
priate to its new level of amenity. For example, at location X rent
rises from the level indicated by point A on contour n, to that indi-
cated by point A„ on contour n_, since abatement brings to this location
the amenity level that originally prevailed at location X^. Similarly,
rent at the latter location rises from B to B , since that location
J- 2
now has the amenity level originally existing at location X_. Thus,
the revised rent schedule associated with an amenity change is predict-
able from a knowledge of the original or reference schedule. For renters,
the benefits of an amenity change will be fully offset by the rent in-
crease, and property owners will be the ultimate beneficiaries of the
change.
In a closed locale or city, by contrast, no externally determined
reference schedule of rents exists, and the utility levels of both renters
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and property owners can be affected by amenity changes. If the disamenity
declines linearly from the source, abatement through a drop in source
intensity (with the decay gradient constant) brings a rise in utility
to renters, accompanied by a decrease in the rents of close-in properties
and a rise in the rents of more distant ones. However, this spatial
pattern of rent changes could be reversed if the abatement method differed,
so that the drop in source intensity involved also a lessening of the
decay rate of the disamenity. In either case, the outcome for property
owners would be mixed, with some enjoying higher rents and property values
and others suffering lower ones. In contrast, if the disamenity declines
exponentially from the source, property owners will be shielded from the
effects of amenity changes. With source intensity changes, rents and
hence property values remain constant, and the amenity changes are re-
flected solely in the utility changes of renters. The respective out-
comes for renters, on the one hand, and property owners on the other are
thus the reverse of what occurs in an open city.
In contrast to the bid price schedule, the MWTPZ schedule in a
closed city does not differ from that in an open one. Moreover, the
MWTPZ schedule is not affected by a change in the source intensity of
the disamenity or the form of the decay function. In sum, whether the
city is closed or open, the MWTPZ depends only on the level of Z. How-
ever, in a closed city, in contrast to an open one, a knowledge of the
MWTPZ will not facilitate prediction of the revised rent schedule that
follows an amenity change.
The foregoing open city-closed city differences carry over to the
two-group case. Other features worth stressing in the two-group, or
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multi-group, case are 1) that the less sensitive group may actually
benefit from the presence of a disamenity; and 2) that hedonic price
functions are liable to the hazard of overestimating the marginal worth
of abatement to the more heavily impacted but less sensitive group and
underestimating it for the less heavily impacted but more sensitive group,
But these features of the two-group case are not unique to the closed
city setting.
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Footnotes
*University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. I am indebted to Jan
Brueckner for acquainting me with the analytical framework used in this
paper and for helpful and patient counsel on many points.
The literature is extensive. Basic references would include
Polinsky and Shavell (1976), Freeman (1979, ch. 6), and Mills (1972,
chs. 4 and 5).
2
Even the "city" as an entity for study may be too large for some
purposes (Abelsen, 1979, pp. 12-13).
3
Alternatively, our defined land area might be circular, with the
disamenity source at the center.
In this kind of situation, a renter's preference for any location
is affected by both the amenity change at that location and amenity
changes at other locations, the latter being the opportunity cost of
residing at the instant site. Polinsky and Shavell (1975, p. 103) call
the first of these effects "direct" and the second "indirect."
The outcome in this latter case can be demonstrated by consider-
ing how price at X = X compares with price at X = in the initial
equilibrium and after a joint change in c and g. From (7) we have
P —
X=X
p
x=o
f \
V
c-gX,
-Y/8
Since y < 0, the exponent is positive. The denominator_of the right
side represents the intensity of the disamenity at X = X and, by assump-
tion, the joint change in c and g leaves this intensity unchanged. (Cf.
m and m,, in Figure 1.) A decline in c must therefore reduce the
value of the right side of the equation and the ratio PvJ7/Pv_n . ThisA—A A-
U
necessarily implies that with abatement the contour rotates clockwise,
in contrast to the previous case.
It is customary in a closed urban model to assume that absentee
ownership prevails. However, it suffices for our purposes and is within
the bounds of plausibility to imagine a community that is closed resi-
dentially but part of an open economy with respect to commerce, income
generation, and asset ownership. In such an economy, changes in the
asset values of owner-occupants need not upset the equilibrium bid-price
outcomes
.
As Small (1975, p. 105) has noted, the central issue of the
costs of pollution from the standpoint of willingness-to-pay has tended
to be obscured by heavy discussion relating to the prediction of changes
in aggregate oroperty values in response to changes in pollution levels.
-26-
A related limiting feature of this function is that the resultant
demand functions have unitary price elasticity. This implies an equil-
ibrium schedule of constant gross rentals (PL), and implicitly property
values, across the land space. Operationally, this poses an obvious
awkwardness for regression analysis. This point appears to have been
overlooked in a regression study by Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1977, pp.
170-74).
q
This case corresponds precisely to the "possible . . . example"
referred to by Polinsky and Shavell (1976, p. 126).
In certain instances, what is a pollutant for one person may be
a pleasure for another. Loud rock music is an example.
A group's family of bid-price contours will be steeper the
greater its |t|, and the S group's contours will thus have the greater
slope at any location. Given this circumstance and the condition that
both groups must fit within the limited land space, the I group will
be able to outbid the S group only if it locates near to the source
rather than toward the end of the island. (See Wheaton, 1977, pp.
202-0 3. Also Diamond and Tolley, 1982, pp. 15-16.)
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